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STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR CAUSING DEATH.
The question regarding the right to maintain an action, in-
dependently of statute, for damages, for causing the death of
a person, may be considered as finally set at rest, since the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Insurance
Company v. Brame (1877), 95 U. S. 75 4 , holding, in accordance
with the English decisions and the almost uniform decisions of
our own courts, that such an action is not maintainable at law,
and in the case of The Harrisburg (1886), I19 U. S. 199, hold-
ing the rule to be the same in admiralty. We may reasonably
expect that that question will not be much mooted hereafter.
But in place of it, Lord Campbell's Act, and our various State
statutes modeled upon it, which have been designed to supply
the defect of the common law, have raised not one, but many
difficult questions, which seem likely to prove an inexhaustible
source of litigation.
The principal questions raised, and those which alone we
propose to inquire about, involve, if they are not always con-
sidered to turn upon, the nature of the right conferred, or
intended to be conferred, by the Act. Does it give an entirely
new right of action, or merely provide for the survival of the
right of action for injury to the person, which at common law
does not survive?
Blake v. 1idland Ry Co., i8 Q. B. 93, a leading English
case decided in 1852, involved the question of the measure of
damages under the Act, and it was held (the action being by an
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administratrix, who was also the widow of the deceased), that
the jury should not be allowed to take into consideration the
mental sufferings or bereavement of the plaintiff for the loss of
her husband, but must give compensation for pecuniary loss
only. Mr. Justice COLERIDGE said therein:
The title of this Act may be some guide to its meaning; and it is "An Act for
compensating the families of persons killed," not for solacing their wounded feel-
ings. Reliance was placed upon the first section, which states in what cases the
newly-given action may be maintained, although death has ensued; the argument
being that the party injured, if he had recovered, would have been entitled to a sola-
tium, and therefore so shall his representatives on his death. But it will be evident
that this Act does not transfer this right of action to his representative, but gives to
the representative a totally new right of action, on different principles. Section Two
enacts that "in every such action, the jury may give such damages as they may
think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death, to the parties respect-
ively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought ' The measure
of damage is not the loss or suffering of the deceased, but the injury resulting
from his death to his family. .
In Franklin v. Southeastern R'y Co. (1858), 3 H. & N. 211, and in Dalton v.
Samle (1858), 4 C. B. (N. S.) 296, suits were maintained on account of the death
of sons, for the benefit of parents, and damages allowed to be assessed on the
basis of reasonable expectation on the part of the latter, of pecuniary benefit to be
derived from the continuance of their sons' lives; but in the latter case the ex-
penses of funeral and mourning were disallowed, Mr. Justice WILLES saying, that
"the subject matter of the statute is compensation for injury by reason of the
relative not being alive."
It has been held, too, in England, that some actual damage
must be shown, or the action cannot be maintained; that the
recovery of nominal damages is not permissible: .Duckwortk
v. Johnson (1859), 4 H. & N. 653; Boulter v. Webster (1865),
13 W. R. 289; s. c., I I L. T. (N. S.) 598.
In Pyrn v. Great Northern R'y Co. (1862), 2 B. & S. 759;
affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber (1863), 4 B. & S. 396, it
was held that damages were recoverable on account of a change
in the mode of distribution of property among the members of
a family, produced by the death complained of, although no
pecuniary loss to the family, in the aggregate, would result.
COCKBURN, C. J., said, in his opinion in the lower court:
It was contended that, inasmuch as if death had not ensued from the effects of
the accident, the deceased could have had no right of action against the company,
in respect of a pecuniary loss arising only on his death, this action could not be
maintained by his representative, inasmuch as the right of action is given only
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where the deceased could have maintained an action, if death had not ensued.
We were at first struck by this argument, but on consideration we are of opinion
that the condition that the action could have been maintained by the deceased, if
death had not ensued, has reference not to the nature of the loss or injury sus-
tained, but to the circumstances under which the bodily injury arose, and the
nature of the wrongful act, neglect or default complained of. Thus, if the deceased
had, by his own negligence, materially contributed to the accident whereby he lost
his life, as he, if still living, could not have an action in respect of any bodily injury,
notwithstanding there might have been negligence on the part of the defendants,
the present action could not have been supported. But supposing the circum-
stances of the negligence to have been such that, if death had not ensued, the de-
ceased might have brought his action in respect of any injury arising to him from
it, we are of opinion that his representative may maintain an action in respect of an
injury arising from a pecuniary loss occasioned by the death, although that pecu-
niary loss would not have resulted from the accident to the deceased, had he lived.
Although the statute, and these decisions applying it, make
-the injury resulting to third parties from the death, the sole
ground of recovery; excluding from the computation of dam-
ages the loss or suffering of the deceased; and notwithstanding
the language of the court in Blake v. Midland Railway Com-
pany (185z), i8 Q. B. 93, to the effect that the Act does not
transfer the decedent's right of action to his representative, but
gives a totally new right of action; the Court of Queen's Bench
(in which also the latter case arose), held in Read v. Great
Eastern R'y Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 555, that a settlement
made by the decedent in his lifetime, with the company respon-
sible for the injury, was a bar to an action under the statute,
after his death. None of the judges constituting the court
when Blake v. Midland R'y Co., supra, was decided, were on
the bench at this time. The language of Justices BLACKBURN
and LUSH, who alone delivered opinions, indicates quite a dif-
ferent theory of the statute, from that advanced in the cases
heretofore cited, and deserves attention. Said Mr. Justice
BLACKBURN:
Before that statute, the person who received a personal injury and survived its
consequences, could bring an action and recover damages for the injury, but, if he
died from its effects, then no action could be brought. To meet this state of the
law, the 9 & Io Vict. c. 73, was passed, and whenever the death of a person is
caused by a wrongful act, and the act is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, and recover damages in
respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who would have been
liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages notwith-
standing the death of the party injured. Here, taking the plea to be true, the
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party injured could not maintain an action in respect thereof, because he had
already received satisfaction. Then comes section two, which regulates the amount
of damages and provides for its apportionment in a manner different to that which
would have been awarded to a man in his lifetime. This section may provide a
new principle as to the assessment of damages, but it does not give any new right
of action. Mr. Codd was driven to argue that the executor could bring a fresh
action, even if the deceased had recovered damages in an action; but to
hold this would be to strain the words of the section. The intention of the enact-
ment was, that the death of the person injured should not free the wrong-doer from
an action, and in those cases where the person injured could maintain an action
his personal representative might sue.
Mr. Justice LUSH said:
The intention of the statute is not to make the wrong-doer pay damages twice
for the same wrongful act, but to enable the representatives of the person injured,
to recover in a case where the maxim, adtio personalis moriur cum persona, would
have applied. It only points to a case where the party injured has not received
compensation against the wrong-doer. It is true, section two provides a different
mode of assessing damages, but that does not give a fresh cause of action.
Barnett v. Lucas (t872), Irish Rep. 6 C. L 247, was an ac-
tion by a widow, as administratrix of her husband, to recover
for damage to personal property of the intestate, caused by the
explosion of a boiler supplied by the defendants. The intes-
tate had himself been killed by the explosion and the plaintiff
had, in a former action, recovered for his death. It was held
by the majority of the court of the Irish exchequer chamber
that such recovery was no bar to this action, on the ground
.that the statute gives a new right of action, as decided in Blake
v. Miland R' y Co. (1852), 18 Q. B. 93, and Pyin v. Great North-
ern R'y Co. (1862), 2 B. & S. 759, although it may be, as held
in Read v. Great Eastern Rly Co. (I868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 555,
that two actions cannot be brought for the same injury to the
person.
FITZGERALD, B., dissented, holding that damages could not,
by reason of the statute, be twice recovered in respect to the
same wrongful act, relying on the last named case; and saying,
with regard to the statement, that the Act gives a totally new
right of action, that, while that is true in a sense, "this new
right is given by preserving the cause of action which was in
the deceased, so as to be available, notwithstanding the death."
Notwithstanding the well settled principle of the common
law, that an action for tort to the person dies with the person
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and will not survive to the representatives of the injured party,
it was held in 1875, in Bradshaw v. Lancashire & Yorkshire
Rly Co. (1875), L. R. io C. P. 189, that the right of action for
pecuniary injury, 'consequent upon injury to the person, that
is, the expense of medical aid and the injury to the person's
business resulting from his being disabled from attending to it,
will survive; the latter being regarded as separable from the
personal injury, that is, the bodilypain and suffering. It was also
held that this principle was not affected by Lord Campbell's
Act, and that an executrix could maintain an action to recover
for the pecuniary damage resulting to her testator from a per-
sonal injury, or, as it was termed, the damage to his personal
estate, notwithstanding his death resulted from the injury. The
defendant in the action was a common carrier, on whose road
the testator was riding as a passenger when the injury was re-
ceived, and the action was brought in contract.
Said Mr. Justice GROVE:
Does the fact that in this case, besides the. injury to the estate, the testator's
death has likewise resulted from the breach of contract, make any difference, or
does the fact that provision has been made in such cases for compensation in res-
pect of the death to certain relatives, by Lord Campbell's Act, take away any right
of action that the executrix would have had but for the Act? It does not seem to
me that the Act has that effect, either expressly or by necessary implication. The
intention of the Act was to give the personal representative a right to recover com-
pensation as a trustee for children or other relatives left in a worse pecuniary posi-
tion by reason of the injured person's death, not to affect any existing right be-
longing to the personal estate in general. There is no reason why the statute
should interfere with any right of action an executor would have had at common
law. In the case of such right of action, he sues as legal owner of the general
personal estate, which has descended to him in course of law; under the Act he
sues as trustee, in respect of a different right altogether, on behalf of particular
persons designated in the Act.
The following year, 1876, a case arose in the Queen's Bench
(Leggott v. Great Northern R'y Co., i Q. B. Div. 599), where
an administratrix brought an action like that in Bradshaw
v. Lancashire & Yorkshire R'y Co. (1875), L. R. 1o C. P. 189,
after a prior suit and recovery under Lord Campbell's Act.
As to the survival of the right of action for pecuniary loss suf-
fered by the intestate in his life-time as a result of the personal
injury, the judges felt bound by the last named case, though
they doubted the correctness of the decision. It was assumed,
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apparently, that the prior suit and recovery were no bar to the
present action (though whether some question might not have
been made on that point, as in the Bradshaw case, there ap-
pears to have been no prior recovery), and it was claimed by
the plaintiff that the finding of negligence, etc., on the part of
the defendant in the prior suit, estopped it to deny such neg-
ligence, etc., in this suit The plaintiff's contention was over-
ruled, on the ground that the two actions were not brought by
the administratrix in the same right, Mr. Justice MELLOR
saying:
It seems that though nominally, the machinery of the action in the one case is.
the same as the machinery in the other, yet the action in which the verdict has
been recovered, was an action of a very special and limited description. It was
an action given.expressly by the statute, and must be confined within the limits of
the statute. It was to provide for what the law had not before provided for,
namely, the right of an administrator or executor to sue for the benefit of the
family, in respect of the death of the deceased, occasioned by the negligence of
other persons. * * * It is to be observed that the executrix, in a case under
the Act, does not sue in respect of anything which belonged to the deceased, but
by force of the statute, which enacts that the deceased's death is to be made the
subject of an action, just as if he had lived;
and Mr. Justice QUAIN saying:
Lord Campbell's Act enables an action to be brought in a case where it could not
have been brought before that Act, namely, when the man has suffered a personal
injury, and dies in consequence. After his death, before Lord Campbell's Act, no
such action could have been maintained, because the death destroyed it. It fell
with the life of the individual injured. Now Lord Campbell's Act gives an en-
tirely new action, not an action connected with the estate of the deceased in the
slightest degree, and the damages recoverable in it would be no part of the estate
of the deceased,
As to the correctness or incorrectness of the holding in the
Bradshaw case, as to the survival of a right of action for pecu-
niary loss, distinct from the personal injury, we need not cori-
cern ourselves; but, independently of that question, the Brad-
shaw and Leggott cases and Barnett v. Lucas (1872), Irish Rep.
6 C. L. 247, have an important bearing on the question as to
the true theory of Lord Campbell's Act. They certainly all
favor the view that the right of action given by the Act, is a
new right and not merely a continuance in the personal repre-
sentatives of a right vested in the decedent in his lifetime.
It may be thought that the statute was not necessarily in-
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volved in Barmtt v. Lucas (1872), Irish Rep. 6 C. L. 247, as a
recovery was only sought therein for damage done to personal
property, and that the decision must have been the same, what-
ever view was entertained regarding it; but the fact that one
of the judges who differed from the others in his views regard-
ing Lord Campbell's Act, dissented also from their conclusions,
perhaps disposes of this suggestion. At least, it shows in a
pointed manner, that the question which we are investigating,
was supposed to be necessarily involved, and gives correspond-
ing weight to the decision of the majority of the Court, who
would naturally have taken narrower ground, and so have
avoided the troublesome question on which the dissenting
members differed from them, if it had been, in their view, pos-
sible to so dispose of the case. The Barnett, Bradshaw and
Leggott cases may be said to establish, that rights which would
otherwise survive to the personal representatives of an injured
person, are not cut off or merged, in case death ensues from
the injury, and a consequent right of action arises under Lord
Campbell's Act. It will be important to recall this, in connec-
tion with certain American cases, to be considered presently,
and arising in States where Acts of two descriptions existed:
one simply providing for the survival of rights of action for
injury to the person, and thus in terms repealing the common
law doctrine on that subject; the other modeled after Lord
Campbell's Act.
Statutes resembling more or less closely Lord Campbell's
Act, have been enacted in most of our States and Territories,
and it has been almost uniformly held that the damages recov-
erable under them are exclusive of any loss or damage to the
injured party during his life, and include only the loss caused,
to the persons specified by the Act, by his death. (See cases
cited in 2 Thompson on Negligence, p. 1289, §90; Cooley on
Torts, *271.) It has sometimes been held, too, and it serves to
emphasize the last point, that the declaration must allege that
the deceased left a widow, husband, or next of kin surviving
him or her. (See 2 Thompson on Negligence, p. 1287, §89.)
In an early New York case of the latter character, (Safford v.
Drew, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 627, decided in 1854, it was said in the
opinion, that the damages are "not given for a cause of action,
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which by force of the statute survives the death, but entirely
for a new cause which the death itself originates ": per DUER,
J., p. 633. An Illinois case, decided a few years later, Chicago
v. -ajor (1857), 18 Ill. 349, involved the question of damages
generally, and the question was iaised whether the death of
one leaving next of kin, but not leaving a widow, was action-
able, the statute making the damages recoverable for the ben-
efit of widow and next of kin. The latter point was resolved
in the affirmative; but the Court said, "This is a new cause of
action given by this statute and unknown to the common law."
In a later Illinois case (Chicago & Rock Is. R. R. Co. v. Morris
(186I), 26 Ill. 4oo, holding a complaint defective, even after
verdict, for not alleging that deceased left a widow or next of
kin surviving him, the Court said:
The statute evidently intends to give no damages for the injury received by the
deceased, but refers wholly to the pecuniary loss whibh his wife and next of kin
may be proved to have sustained, and the damages are not assets, to be applied to
the general necessities of the estate, but belong exclusively to the widow and next
of kin, to whom they are to be distributed. The statute makes this pecuniary loss,
the sole measure of damages. The satisfaction of that loss is, therefore, the sole
purpose for which an action can be instituted, there being nothing to be allowed
for the bereavement, for solatium. This being so, the facts that there are persons
entitled by law to claim this indemnity, and that they have sustained a loss justi-
fying their claim, must be proved * * * and therefore must be averred. * **
'We are satisfied there is no right of action under this statute, except upon the basis
of a pecuniary damage sustained by the widow and next of kin of the deceased,
[and cited approvingly Safford v. Drew and Chicago v. Major, just referred to,
and the English case of Blake v. AMidlandf'y Co.]
In Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 Il. 68, decided in 1875, the
same Court went so far as to hold, that when the complaint
only alleged the existence of a father of the deceased, it could
not be shown that other relatives, viz., a mother, brothers, and
sisters, also survived him.
Said Mr. Justice HOAR, in a Massachusetts case, decided in
1867 (Richardson v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 85): "It
is not the injury to the deceased which is to be estimated at
all." It is generally held in this country, contrary to the Eng-
lish cases which we have cited, that, where there is a widow or
next of kin surviving, nominal damages may be recovered,
although no substantial pecuniary loss to them be shown:
2 Thompson on Negligence, p. 1293. In Dickens v. N.Y. Cen-
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tralR. R. Co. (1858), 28 Barb. (N.Y.) 41, it was held, that an
action was maintainable by the representatives of a married
woman, and it was said that the damages are not limited to the
pecuniary loss, the word "may" being used in the statute: See
Dimmey v. R.R. Co. (1885), 27 W. Va. 32, and cases there cited
to the same effect.
In Tennessee, under a statute which provides that-
The right of action which a person, who (lies from injuries received from
another, or whose death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another,
would have had against the wrong-doer, in case death had not ensued, shall not
abate or be extinguished by his death; but shall pass to his personal representa-
tives, for the benefit of his widow and next of kin, free from the claims of his
creditors.
It was held that those damages were recoverable which the
injured person could himself have recovered if he had lived:
Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Burke (1 868), 6 Cold. (Tenn.)
45 ; Nashville & C. R.R. Co. v. Prince (1871), 2 Heisk. (Tenn.)
580. In the former of these two cases, it was held that only
such damages were recoverable; in the latter, that damages
resulting to third persons from the death, were also recover-
able. These Tennessee cases have no significance in respect
to the subject under discussion, as they merely involve the
construction of a peculiar statute, which is unlike Lord Camp-
bell's Act. The statement alluded to, as contained in the case
in Barbour, is not supported by any other authority. It has
always been assumed, when not expressly decided, that the
damages which the statute provides the jury "may" give,
include all which they can be allowed to give.
It is said in Cooley on Torts (p. 264), that "a question has
also been made. in some States, whether suit could be main-
tained where the death was instantaneous; and in Massachu-
setts, under a somewhat nice and technical construction of the
statute, it was decided that the action would not lie in such a
case. But, probably, under no existing statute would it be so
held now." With all respect for the learned author, it is sub-
mitted that this criticism of the Maszachusetts case cited by
him is not well founded.
That case (Kearney Adm'r v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co.
(1851), 9 Cush. (Mass.) io8, did not involve the construction
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of an act like Lord Campbell's- Act, but, as appears by a note
to the second edition of Judge Cooley's work, of a statute
merely providing, in so many words, for the survival of rights
of action for injury to the person.- The Court held that no-
action was maintainable by the administrator under such a
statute, where the injury complained of produced instant death,
because in such case, no right of action vested in the injured
person so as to pass to his representatives.
"The statute," said Chief Justice SHAW, "supposes the party deceased to have
been once entitled to bring an action for damages for the injury. * •* * A
distinction is to be taken between cases thus brought by'executors and administra-
tors of the person injured, and cases where persons sue who claim that their own
rights have been infringed."
This decision has been affirmed again and again, in Massa-
chusetts, and the doctrine laid down is well settled law there;
the principal controversy in the subsequent cases has been as
to in what cases the death is to be considered immediate, so as
to prevent the vesting- of a right of action, and as to the right
to recover substantial damages where the injured person, though
surviving the accident for a short period, remains unconscious
until death: Hollenbeck v. Berkshire R1. R. Co. (1852), 9 Cush.
(Mass.) 478; Bancroft v. Roston & Worcester R. R. Co. (1865),
i I Allen (Mass.) 34; fforan v. Hollings (1878), 125 Mass. 93;
Kennedy v. Standard Sugar Refinery (1878), 125 Id. 90; Cor-
coran v. Boston & Albany R.R. Co. (1882) 133 Id. 507; Tidly
v. Fitchburg R.R. Co. (1883), 134 Id. 499; Riley v. Connecticut
River R. R. Co. (1883), 135 Id. 292; see note to second.edition
of Cooley on Torts,*265 ; Nourse v. Packard(1885), 138 Id.
307; Tlhchaheyv. Washburn Car Wheel Co. (1887), i45 Id. 281.
So, it would certainly be absurd to hold that Lord Camp-
bell's Act does not apply to cases of instantaneous death, and
the Massachusetts court has not committed that absurdity.
Until recently there has been no statute in Massachusetts, giv-
ing a right of action, such as is given by Lord Campbell's Act,
but there has long been an act giving a similar remedy, in a
limited class of cases except that it is pursued by indictment,
instead of by private action. The defendant, under the pro-
ceeding described, is mulcted in damages, if found guilty, and
the damages are distributed to the relatives, as if recovered by
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civil suit. It has never been claimed that this statute does not
apply to cases of instantaneous death, but it has been claimed,
both with regard to this Massachusetts statute and a similar
one in Maine, thatt they apply only to cases of instantaneous
death; a much more reasonable contention. That position
was sustained by the Maine, though not by the Massachusetts
court: Commnonwealth v. Metropolitan R. R. Co. (87I), 107
Mass. 236; State v. Maine Central R. R. Co. (1872), 6o Me.
490; State v. Grand Trunk R'y (1873), 6I Id. i I4- The argu-
ment, in those cases, for limiting the application of the statute,
to cases of instant death, was, that in case the injured person
survived the accident, a right of action would vest in him,
which, by virtue of the statute making injuries to the person
survive (Maine as well as .Massachusetts has such an act),
would pass to his personal representative, and that a double
remedy should not be allowed. The Massachusetts' court
(per COLT, J.), answered this argument as follows-
A common law action, surviving under the statute to the administrator, and an
indictment under the statute, do not cover the same ground. In the former,
damages for the personal injury to the deceased are alone recovered; in the latter,'
the purpose is to secure to the relatives some compensation for the loss to them, as
well as to inflict some punishment for the offence. In one, damages are recovered,
which in due settlement of the estate may never come to the" relatives. * * *
It is not important to consider now what effect, if any, proof of a judgment in a
civil action, or a settlement with the party injured, or his representatives, would
have upon the prosecution of an indictment for the same act of negligence.
Taking the opposite view, the Maine court said, through
Mr. Justice WALTON, in the first-named Maine case-
If he does not die immediately, a right of action accrues to him which will sur-
vive to his personal representatives, and no other remedy is needed: R. S., C. 87,
8. But, if he does die immediately, no right of action will accrue to him, and
of course none will survive to his heirs, or to his personal representatives for their
benefit. * * * We think the remedy, by indictment, was intended to apply to
the latter class of cases alone. To hold otherwise would involve the Legislature
in the absurdity of creating two independent, and to some extent conflicting, rem-
edies for one and the same injury. We think the remedy, by indictment, was in-
tended to apply to a class of cases where none would otherwise exist. * * *
The remedy by indictment ends where the remedy by civil suit begins. Thus con-
strued, the statutes are in harmony and the absurdity of supposing that the Legis-
lature intended to create two independent and conflicting remedies, for one and
the same injury, is avoided.
